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spiratory protection for healthcare workers treating Ebola
rus disease (EVD): Are facemasks sufﬁcient to meet
cupational health and safety obligations?
Ebola virus (EV) is a ﬁlovirus which causes viral
morrhagic fever (VHF) in humans (World Health
anization (WHO), 2014a). Fruit bats of the family
ropodidae are thought to be the natural reservoir and
ans are thought to acquire the disease through direct
tact with non-human primates (NHP) (Leroy et al.,
5). The ﬁrst cases of Ebola virus disease (EVD) were
orted in 1976 in the Democratic Republic of Congo and
ce then sporadic cases and small scale outbreaks have
urred in central African countries (World Health
anization, 2014d–f). There are ﬁve strains of EV but
 Zaire strain is the most severe, with a case-fatality rate
to 90% (World Health Organization (WHO), 2014a). The
recedented scale of the current outbreak of EVD in
ra Leone, Guinea, Liberia and Nigeria, led to the World
lth Organization (2014d–f) declaring an international
lic health emergency on August 8th 2014. The
break has since spread to Senegal, and a reportedly
elated outbreak has since occurred in the Democratic
ublic of Congo (World Health Organization (WHO),
4b). As of 22nd August 2014, the West African outbreak
 resulted in 2615 cases and 1427 deaths and is
recedented because it has continued for more than
ble the length of time of the largest previous outbreak
ganda in 2000 (3 months vs. 8 months), has resulted in
re than six times as many cases (425 cases vs. 2615
es), and has for ﬁrst time occurred in more than one
ntry simultaneously and in capital cities (Okware et al.,
2; World Health Organization, 2014d–f). Among the
l cases, 1251 have been laboratory conﬁrmed, and
etic sequencing has showed that the similarity of the
virus to the Zaire EV is 97% (Baize et al., 2014). Unlike past
outbreaks, the current outbreak of EVD has not been
contained and has resulted in social unrest, breakdown in
law and order, shortages of personal protective equipment
(PPE) and depletion of the healthcare workforce, with over
240 healthcare workers (HCWs) becoming infected and
120 HCW deaths as of 25th August 2014 (World Health
Organization (WHO), 2014c). The inability to contain this
outbreak has been blamed variously on lapses in infection
control, shortages of PPE and other supplies, myths and
misconceptions about EVD, and the fact that it is occurring
in large cities rather than small villages.
HCWs, many of whom are nurses, are on the frontline of
the response, and their occupational health and safety is
critical to control of the outbreak and maintenance of the
health workforce during a crisis. The WHO, the US Centers
for Disease Control (1998) and several other countries
recommend surgical masks for HCWs treating Ebola
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014a–c;
World Health Organization, 2014d–f) whilst other coun-
tries (The Department of Health UK, 2014) and Me´decins
Sans Frontie`res (MSF) have recommend the use of
respirators (Sterk, 2008) (Table 1). We question the
recommendations for surgical masks and outline evidence
on the use of respiratory protection for HCWs, and the
issues that must be considered when selecting the most
appropriate type of protection.
1. Background controversy about face masks
There is ongoing debate and lack of consensus around
the use of respiratory protection for HCWs for respiratory
diseases, including inﬂuenza, which is reﬂected in incon-
sistencies between policies and guidelines across health-
care organizations and countries (Chughtai et al., 2013). In
the healthcare setting facemasks (medical/surgical masks)
are generally used to protect wearers from splashes and
sprays of blood or body ﬂuids and to prevent spread of
ords:
la virus
la virus disease
masks
irators
lthcare workers
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respiratory protection (Siegel et al., 2007). The mode of
disease transmission is one factor which inﬂuences the
selection of facemasks or respirators – for example,
facemasks are recommended for infections transmitted
through contact and droplets, while respirators are recom-
mended for airborne infections. Such guidelines are based
on often tenuous theoretical principles informed by limited
experimental evidence, given the lack of data drawn from
the complex clinical environment. Transmission is not fully
elucidated for many infections, spread can occur by multiple
modes and the relative contribution of each mode may not
be precisely quantiﬁed. Further, host related factors can
mediate the severity of the disease. Some diseases
exclusively transmit through the airborne route in natural
setting (e.g. tuberculosis), while other diseases mainly
transmit through the droplet or contact modes but short
range respiratory aerosols are generated during high risk
procedures which increases the risk of infection transmis-
sion (Roy and Milton, 2004). For example, the primary mode
of inﬂuenza transmission is thought to be droplet (reﬂected
in guidelines which largely recommend surgical masks), but
there is increasing evidence that it is also spread by short-
range respiratory aerosols (Bischoff et al., 2013; Tellier,
2009). For Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), data
supported both droplet and airborne transmission (Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014a–c; Yu et al.,
2004). Airborne precautions have even been recommended
for measles and varicella-zoster viruses despite a lack of data
(Siegel et al., 2007).
Table 1
Recommendations around the use of mask/respirators to protect healthcare workers from Ebola Virus Disease (EVD).
Organization/country Developed by/year Type of HCWs Recommendation
WHO World Health Organization
(World Health Organization, 2014d–f)
Hospital HCWs Routine care - Medical masks
AGPs – N95 respirators or powered air purifying
respirators (PAPRs).
World Health Organization
(World Health Organization, 2014d–f)
Lab workers N95 respirators or powered air purifying
respirators (PAPRs).
CDC US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) August 2014 (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC))
Hospital HCWs Routine care – Medical masks Fit-tested AGPs –
N95 ﬁltering face piece respirators or higher (e.g.,
powered air purifying respiratory or elastomeric
respirators)
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) August 2014 (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC))
Lab workers Appropriate respirators or a full body suit
WHO/CDC World Health Organization and Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
December 1998 (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention and World Health
Organization)
Hospital HCWs
and Lab workers
Respirators were recommended for HCWs.
Medical and cloth masks were also recommended
in cases respirators were not available
MSF Me´decins Sans Frontie`res (MSF) 2007
(Sterk, 2008)
Hospital HCWs
and Lab workers
High Efﬁciency Particulate ﬁltration (HEPA)
masks
Australia The Department of Health, August 2014 (The
Department of Health. Australia 2014)
Hospital HCWS Routine care – Medical masks
AGPs - P2 (N95) respirators
Department of Health, September 2005
(The Department of Health Australia, 2014)
Lab workers P2 (N95) respirators
United Kingdom (UK) Department of Health August 2014
(The Department of Health UK, 2014)
Hospital HCWs
and Lab workers
Low possibility of VHF infection – Medical masks
High possibility of VHF infection but patient does
NOT have extensive bruising, active bleeding,
uncontrolled diarrhoea, uncontrolled vomiting –
Medical masks
High possibility of VHF infection but patient does
have extensive bruising, active bleeding,
uncontrolled diarrhoea, uncontrolled vomiting –
FFP3 respirators
Conﬁrmed VHF infection or AGPs in any situation
– FFP3 respirators
Canada Public Health Agency of Canada, August 2014
(Public Health Agency of Canada, 2014b)
Hospital HCWS Medical masks; ﬁt-tested respirators (seal-
checked NIOSH approved N95 at a minimum) for
AGPs
Public Health Agency of Canada
August 2014 (Public Health Agency of Canada,
2014a)
Lab workers Particulate respirators (e.g., N95, or N100) or
powered air purifying respirators (PAPRs)
Belgium Superior Health Council July 2014
(Superior Health Council, Belgium 2014)
Hospital HCWs
and Lab workers
Patients categorized as ‘possibility of EMD –
Surgical mask for routine care and FFP3 respirator
or EN certiﬁed equivalent for AGPs
Patients categorized as ‘high possibility’ or
‘conﬁrmed EMD’ – FFP3 respirators
South Africa Department of Health (Draft guidelines)
August 2014 (Department of Health, South
Africa 2014)
Hospital HCWS Preferably N95 respirators
CDC = Centers for Disease Control; HCW = Health Care Workers; MSF = Me´decins Sans Frontie`res; WHO = World Health Organization.
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Editorial / International Journal of Nursing Studies 51 (2014) 1421–1426 1423To date, only four randomized controlled clinical trials
Ts) and ﬁve papers on the clinical efﬁcacy of
emasks in the healthcare setting have been published
obs et al., 2009; Loeb et al., 2009; MacIntyre et al.,
1, 2013, 2014b). One of these had only 32 subjects
obs et al., 2009), and one had 446 subjects (Loeb et
2009). The largest RCTs conducted (by authors CRM,
and colleagues) on N95 respirators and masks, with
9 and 1441 subjects, respectively, showed a beneﬁt
ociated with using N95 respirators and failed to show
 beneﬁt of surgical masks (MacIntyre et al., 2011,
3). In one of the trials, the majority of laboratory
ﬁrmed infections were with respiratory syncytial
s and inﬂuenza, neither of which are thought to be
dominantly airborne (MacIntyre et al., 2013). These
a support the concept that transmission of viruses is
ltimodal and caution against dogmatic paradigms
ut pathogens and their transmission, particularly
en the disease in question has a high case-fatality rate
 no proven pharmaceutical interventions.
Respirators are designed for respiratory protection
 are indicated for infections transmitted by aerosols
cIntyre et al., 2011, 2013). However, this is based
ely on the fact that they have superior ﬁltration
acity, and can ﬁlter smaller particles. The guidelines
 to consider that respirators offer the additional
eﬁt of being ﬁtted, therefore creating a seal around
 face. It is also possible that the seal achieved by a
pirator may be an additional beneﬁt over and above
 superior ﬁltration that they offer. Respirators are not
ulated by ﬁt however, only on ﬁltration capacity (with
ation of airborne particles being the sole consider-
n in guidelines), but the seal offered by a respirator
s to the protection when compared to other mask
es. The risk of infection with respiratory pathogens
reases three-fold during aerosol-generating proce-
es (AGPs) such as intubation and mechanical ventila-
 (MacIntyre et al., 2014a). Respirators are generally
ommended in these situations for diseases that are
wn to be transmitted though the droplet route such
nﬂuenza and SARS (Chughtai et al., 2013), so the fact
t they are not recommended more broadly for a
ease with a much higher case-fatality rate such as
, is concerning.
odes of transmission of Ebola
The inability to control the West African Ebola outbreak
 led to debate around the mode of transmission of EV,
h some public health agencies suggesting aerosol
smission (Murray et al., 2010). Current evidence
gests that human to human transmission occurs
dominantly though direct contact with blood and body
retions, (World Health Organization (WHO), 2014a) and
 is the basis of the WHO and the CDC recommendations
facemasks to protect HCWs from EVD.
However, like inﬂuenza and SARS, there is some
dence of aerosol transmission of EVD. In an observa-
al study from The Democratic Republic of Congo, of the
EVD cases who visited the home of an EVD patient, 14
 contact with the infected case while the remaining ﬁve
had no history of any contact, which points to transmission
through some other mode (Roels et al., 1999). There is
some evidence from experimental animal studies that EVD
can be transmitted without direct contact; however these
studies generally do not differentiate between droplet and
airborne transmission (Dalgard et al., 1992; Jaax et al.,
1995; Johnson et al., 1995). In one study, six monkeys were
divided into three groups and each group was exposed to
low-dose or high-dose aerosolized EV and aerosolized
uninfected cell culture ﬂuid (control), respectively. All four
monkeys exposed to EV developed infection (Johnson et al.,
1995). Jaax et al. found that two of three control monkeys
caged in the same room as monkeys with EVD, 3 m apart,
died of EVD (Jaax et al., 1995).
Studies have also shown that pigs may transmit EV
though direct contact or respiratory aerosols (Kobinger et
al., 2011). In one study, monkeys without direct contact
contracted EBV from infected pigs in separate enclosures
(Weingartl et al., 2012). It was not clear whether
transmission was due to respiratory aerosols or large
droplets. The ﬁrst infection occurred in a monkey caged
near the air ventilation system and positive air samples
identiﬁed through real time polymerase chain reaction
(PCR), which raised the possibility of airborne transmis-
sion. However, pigs cough and sneeze more than humans
and thus have more capacity to generate aerosols.
Furthermore, in pigs EVD mainly affects the lungs while
in primates, it mainly affects the gastrointestinal tract and
is excreted in the faeces. As with inﬂuenza, the transmis-
sion characteristics of EVD may also change due to
temperature and humidity, and it should be noted that
the experimental studies on EV transmission were
conducted at low temperature and humidity, which might
have favoured aerosol transmission. A recent study has
shown that nonhuman primate to nonhuman primate
transmission is mainly through contact, with airborne
transmission being unlikely (Alimonti et al., 2014).
Finally it must be emphasized that EV transmission in
high-risk situations is not well studied, particularly during
AGPs, in the handling of human remains or exposure to
surgical smoke due to new surgical technologies like laser
or diathermy. Although the CDC does recommend a
respirator during AGPs for EVD patients, aerosols may
be created in the absence of aerosol-generating proce-
dures. Evidence suggests that aerosols from vomitus can
transmit norovirus, and SARS was likely transmitted via
faecal aerosols (Barker et al., 2004; Marks et al., 2003;
McKinney et al., 2006; Yu et al., 2004). Staff contacts of two
HCWs infected with Ebola in 1996, who were treated in
South Africa, took universal precautions, with respirators
used for high-risk procedures, and no further cases
occurred in 300 potential contacts (Richards et al.,
2000). The report of this outbreak (by author GAR) has
been cited in support of the WHO and CDC guidelines
(Klompas et al., 2014), however in South Africa one HCW
contracted EBV when using normal surgical attire during
placement of a central line in a patient with undiagnosed
EBV. This occurred despite no obvious lapse in infection
control. In contrast, once EBV had been diagnosed in the
HCW, respirators, impermeable one-piece suits and visors
were used (according to South African guidelines), and no
Editorial / International Journal of Nursing Studies 51 (2014) 1421–14261424further infections occurred despite procedures such as
intubation, mechanical ventilation, dialysis, central line
placement and the insertion of a Swan Ganz catheter
(Richards et al., 2000).
3. Factors to consider in guidelines
When determining recommendations for the protec-
tion of HCWs, guidelines should not be based solely on one
parameter, the presumed mode of transmission. A risk-
analysis approach is required that takes into account all
relevant factors which could impact on the occupational
health and safety of HCWs (Fig. 1). The severity of the
outcome (case-fatality rate and disease severity) must be
considered. Any level of uncertainty around modes of
transmission must also be evaluated, particularly if the
disease has a high case-fatality rate. In addition, the
availability of pre- and post-exposure prophylaxis or
treatment must be considered. The immune status and
co-morbidities in HCWs should also be considered, as
some HCWs may be innately more vulnerable to infection.
As the ageing of the nursing workforce occurs in developed
countries, there is likely to be a high proportion of HCWs
with chronic conditions. In this case, facemasks have been
recommended for HCWs by CDC and WHO because of the
assumption that EV is not transmitted via the airborne
route. However, there is uncertainty about transmission,
the consequences of EVD infection are severe, there is no
proven treatment, vaccine or post-exposure prophylaxis.
Recommending a surgical mask for EVD has much more
serious implications than for inﬂuenza, which has a far
lower case-fatality rate and for which there are easily
accessible vaccines and antiviral therapy. Further, numer-
ous HCWs have succumbed to EVD during this epidemic,
including senior physicians experienced in treating EVD and
presumably less likely to have suffered lapses in infection
control (World Health Organization, 2014d–f). Aside from
these factors, it is also important to consider the perspec-
tives of the staff member. In this highly stressful situation,
staff members will want to be reassured that they are using
the highest level of protection and are not putting
themselves and their families/colleagues at risk. This is
especially important if the outbreak escalates and additional
staff members are required to assist. Staff may refuse to treat
patients unless they feel adequately protected.
We feel the recommendations for masks do not apply
risk analysis methods appropriately, and are solely based
on the low probability of non-contact modes of EV spread.
Previous guidance provided by the WHO and CDC for
‘‘Infection Control for Viral Haemorrhagic Fevers in the
African Health Care Setting’’ in 1999 were more
conservative, with both organizations recommending
the preferred use of respirators ﬁrst line and surgical
masks and cloth masks as a last option (Centers for Disease
Control, 1998). Why then, during the worst outbreak of
EVD in history, with the most virulent EV strain and with
hundreds of HCWs succumbing to the disease is it
considered adequate for them to wear surgical masks?
The high case-fatality rate warrants the use of better
protection such as a respirator and full body suit with face
shield, where it can be provided.
4. Consistency of guidelines
There appears to be a double standard in recommenda-
tions for laboratory scientists working with EV, who must
adhere to the highest level of biocontainment (BSL4) when
working with the virus. (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2014a–c; Department of Health and Aging
Australia, 2007) Further, in contrast to HCWs, laboratory
Fig. 1. Factors to consider in making recommendations for respiratory protection of health workers*. *Cost, supply and logistics may affect implementationof guidelines, but should not drive recommendations for best practice.
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Editorial / International Journal of Nursing Studies 51 (2014) 1421–1426 1425rkers are exposed to the virus in a highly controlled,
ile environment in which there is less risk of
smission than in the highly unstable, contaminated
 unpredictable clinical environment. The perceived
quity inherent in these inconsistent guidelines may also
uce the willingness of HCWs to work during an EVD
break.
Table 1 shows recommendations of the selected
anizations and countries regarding the use of masks/
pirators for EVD for HCWs and laboratory workers. Only
 UK and South African guidelines have consistent
delines for HCWs and laboratory scientists, with
pirators recommended for conﬁrmed cases of Viral
morrhagic Fever (including EVD) (Department of
lth, South Africa 2014; Superior Health Council,
gium 2014, The Department of Health UK, 2014).
ong healthcare organizations, only MSF recommends
pirators for EVD, and notably, in contrast to other
rnational agencies including WHO, no MSF worker has
eloped EVD during the West African outbreak (Thom-
, 2007).
In conclusion, whilst EV is predominantly spread by
tact with blood and body ﬂuids, there is some
ertainty about the potential for aerosol transmission.
re is RCT evidence for respirators (but not masks)
viding protection against non-aerosolised infections,
cIntyre et al., 2013) and an abundance of evidence that
smission of pathogens in the clinical setting is rarely
modal. Where uncertainty exists, the precautionary
ciple (that action to reduce risk should not await
ntiﬁc certainty) should be invoked and guidelines
uld be consistent and err on the side of caution.
reover, a clear description of risk should be provided to
Ws (Jackson et al., 2014). Given the predominant mode
transmission, every HCW death from Ebola is a
entially preventable death. It is highly concerning that
cent commentary suggests HCWs do not need a mask at
‘‘to speak with conscious patients, as long as a distance of
 metres is maintained’’(Martin-Moreno et al., 2014).
s fails to consider the changeability and unpredictabili-
f the clinical environment and disregards the rights of
 HCW. It is also unrealistic to believe a HCW can
stantly keep track of their distance from a patient in the
tic acute care setting. We accept that cost, supply and
istics may, in some settings, preclude the use of
pirators, but guidelines should outline best practice
the ideal setting, with discussion about contingency
ns should the ideal recommendation be unfeasible.
ortantly, in the absence of sufﬁcient evidence, recom-
ndations should be conservative and estimation of risk
sidered. Recommendations should be developed using
isk analysis framework, with the occupational health
 safety of HCWs being the primary consideration.
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